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Abstract 
This article focuses on the theme of strengthening government leadership 
within contemporary democracy schemes, irrespective of their forms of Gov-
ernment-parliamentary or presidential. They are, in most cases, lead-
ers-without-party in the sense that, though (formally) sponsored by a political 
party, they manage to impose and legitimize themselves by virtue of their 
personalities along with a team of loyal followers, doing without their own 
party and often opposing to it. This phenomenon of “leadership concentra-
tion” of the head of Government is evident even in parliamentary systems 
where—according with the Germany’s historical prototype—is defined as a 
“chancellor democracy”. We can get many examples of this tendency around 
the world in the latest ten years. The Italian political experience of the last 
thirty years is assumed as an interesting case study, demonstrating the vitality 
and at same time the hidden risks of that process which enhances the person-
alistic model of “leader-without-party”. All within the framework of a weak 
and partial democracy that is defined in various ways: hybrid, dissociative, 
personalized-prodromal signs of a possible step back towards a “populistic 
style”. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper are advanced some findings of a broader search on which I’m 
working about the changes of Western democracy, understood as systems of 
Liberal representative democracies. These are increasingly corrupting in the 
sense that within the political system the Executive power strengthens its posi-
tion in relation to the Parliament, while there is a clear process of personaliza-
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tion of the political leadership and on the other hand there are confusing sugges-
tions of direct and “rethorical democracy” [Tulis, 1987: p. 39].  
The first paragraph introduced the arrival point of this process in what we 
have decided to name “chancellor democracy” [Morlino, 2010: p. 221-222], 
which refers to the figure of the German Prime Minister and the position which 
came to assume, after the tragedy of Nazism, inside the institutional arrange-
ments of contemporary Germany: a position of absolute pre-eminence in inter 
institutional relations, and especially free from party affiliation.  
In the second paragraph three experiences are told that have a lot to do with 
the topic we are dealing with. These experiences correspond to three electoral 
events. In the order in which they happened: 1) UK, Spring 2006: the Brexit op-
tion wins the referendum: 2) USA, Autumn 2016: Donald Trump is elected 
President; 3) France, 2008: the outsider Macron asserts himself in the presiden-
tial elections with an unprecedent personal party, En March. 
In the third part of the paper we assume as a specific case study, the fallout of 
this transformation process on the events of Italian politics, starting with the 
Berlusconi governments from the mid-90s up to the first decade of this century, 
and ending with the leadership assumed by Renzi in a government now freed 
from the control of the parties.  
To conclude with the question of whether this process of personalizing gov-
ernment leadership can lead to populist and anti-democratic derives. 
2. From the Parliamentary Democracy to a “Chancellor  
Democracy” 
A long time has passed, and Western democracy has come a long way since 
Fabbrini, in an article in 1991, conceptualized the leader-party government as an 
alternative to the more usual schemes for cataloguing the strategies of govern-
ment actions, namely the model of the party government and alternatively the 
model of the leader’s government: the first typical of the parliamentary democ-
racies that Lijphart would define “consociational” [Lijphart, 2001], the second of 
the presidential democracies (USA) or semi-presidential (France). However, 
both stem from a common historical root of British parliamentarianism, in 
which there was an absolute coincidence between the leader of the winning party 
in the elections and the premier of the government (in Lijphart’s definition, this 
is the Westminster Model) [Fabbrini, 1991]. 
Apart from the case of Germany, where the Westminster effect manifested it-
self for a long time and acted in the direction of an almost automatic overlap 
between the leader of the majority party and Chancellor (Head of Government), 
through the systemic dynamics of effective bipartisanship within a system of 
proportional caliber, and apart from the case of Israel, which with the ephemeral 
reform of 1993 (immediately abrogated three years later), with which it was de-
cided to proceed with the direct election of the Head of Government at the same 
time as the proportional election of the Knesset (the Lower House), also in It-
aly-almost simultaneously, after the 1994 elections-the conviction had been 
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consolidated that the Prime Minister should be appointed by the President of the 
Republic, as prescribed by the Constitution, but this event turned into a kind of 
due act, as the Head of State could only indicate the leader appointed by the 
party that had won, albeit with a relative majority, the general elections (and not, 
as was previously the case in the so-called “first republic”, the person he consid-
ered most reliable and capable of forming a coalition of majority and govern-
ment as cohesive and stable as possible).  
These are just a few examples of the transformation of the systems of parlia-
mentary democracy - with an associative-consensual structure [Lijphart, 2001] 
into what are defined as “chancellor democracy”, with only an indicative refer-
ence to Germany, which, moreover, almost suffered this same characteristic in 
the post-war years, at least with reference to the bipartisan pillar that has given 
space and life, with increasing frequency, to coalitions of governments (centred 
around the coalition potential of the Liberals of the FPD) and even to the now 
repeated re-editions of Grosse Koalition between CDU and SPDE [Mommsen, 
2007]. Merkel’s leadership, increasingly free from the control of the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU), is an effective demonstration of this transformation. 
Merkel has been the head of the government in Germany since 2005 without 
interruptions with government formulas and alliances of every kind and political 
colour. Hesledership quite divided from political parties (her party, the CDU, 
would never have won the election without her candidacy to the premier) con-
firms the perfect adherence and consistency of what we call, not by chance, 
“chancellor democracy” [Helms, 2011]. 
That other authors apply to different European democratic systems, especially 
those of the “latest generation”. In this sense, the case of Hungary is very popu-
lar, as it seemed to have adopted in 1989, after the Communist dictatorship, a 
scheme of parliamentary democracy similar in many ways to the German model 
and, like this one, slipping towards the strengthening of the role of the premier 
and of the executive power. 
The President of the Republic, elected by the Assembly, has more in common 
with a constitutional monarch than with a politically active role; he has an in-
fluence on the Head of Government, in the sense that he is responsible for the 
appointment shared with that of the Parliament (formally he can only address a 
recommendation that the Assembly must decide by majority whether to accept 
or not). Parliamentary democracy, which dates back to about fifteen years in 
Hungary, has favoured the gradual strengthening of leadership in the executive 
in the face of the resizing of the National Assembly. 
Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister in his second term of office (from 2010, 
previously in 1998 until 2002), had asked the Hungarian people to vote against 
the quotas decided by the EU in order to relocate refugees to Europe. But the 
referendum held in 2016 did not reach the quorum necessary to be validated. 
There was therefore no plebiscite that Orban wanted to obtain, despite the popu-
list leader claiming for himself the (useless) majority of 98% out of a total of 
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voters that slightly exceeds 40% of the total - and despite the widespread discon-
tent in society towards migrants that, however, has not turned into a political 
choice.  
There are other institutional aspects that move in the same direction: the 
electoral system with wide margins of disproportionality, the “vote of construc-
tive distrust”, the lack of a vote of confidence, as well as the political activism of 
the Government Cabinet combined with a certain consolidation of the party 
system and with the international political pressures aimed at shifting the bal-
ance of power in favour of the executive without risking too much the interfer-
ence of the parliamentary passages [Schiemann, 2004].  
After all, these are the same problems that Bernhard faced in the comparative 
analysis between Germany and Poland in the respective historical events of the 
“reconsolidation” of the democratic regime. For Bernhard, the common key to 
the survival and stability of the new democracies lies in the “institutional choice” 
whereby some systems decide to give the president elected by universal suffrage 
broad executive powers, while others prefer to delegate them to a president of 
the council; that is, some choose electoral systems that allow a large number of 
parties, while others establish restrictive rules in this sense. In short, the institu-
tional choice—if you will, the very choice of one or other form of political 
structure—has important repercussions on the successes or failures of democ-
racy [Bernhard, 2005].  
Germany is the classic case of prolonged industrialisation in which there is a 
ramification of totalitarian development. The failure of the hyper-nationalist 
strategy of Nazism, emblematically represented by the defeat in the Second 
World War, which followed the failure of Weimar’s democracy. With the catas-
trophic defeat in the Second World War, the subsequent revival of the democ-
ratic system under the control and auspices of the Western Alliance, and the 
European interpretation of its international mission, Germany has become one 
of the leading countries of globalization. 
Poland, once the symbol of the failure of democratic aspirations in the states 
that survived the break-up of the Soviet empire, today boasts one of the most 
consolidated democratic systems. But here too the wind of the alliance of Visen-
grad (the countries of northern Europe against the continental and Mediterra-
nean countries of the EU) blows among those countries labelled by many ana-
lysts as regimes of “illiberal democracy” [Zakaria, 2007]. In Polland too, first of 
all is the ideological, cultural and political program of the populist nationalist 
party (PiS), winner of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 20151. 
3. USA, UK and France as a Laboratory of the New Trend 
The US president has always been the most consistent example of a leader with-
out a party. Not that in the electoral competitions the parties do not count, on 
 
 
1The approval of a law on the “rationalization” of the judicial system has provoked in 2017 many 
clashes in the country and deep disagreements with the Eu. 
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the contrary they count very much for the financing and the overall organization 
of the electoral campaigns. But only in those. They are said to have an “inter-
mittent” function, in the sense that they “turn on” in the pre-election phase and 
“turn off” in the inter-election phase, leaving almost free reign to the political 
leaders who contributed to their election and immediately returning afterwards 
to break up in their respective lobbies and associations that had formed them. 
The election of Trump at the 2016 presidential elections confirms these char-
acteristics but goes even further: it becomes one of the few cases in American 
political history where a candidacy for the presidency, legitimated by the victory 
in the “primary elections”, not only was not fully supported by the candidate’s 
party of affiliation—the Republican party—but was even often criticized and 
contested by the Republican exponents themselves.  
Well, Trump’s fortune and political successes are largely due to his own 
party’s “orphan”, becoming in effect a leader without a party: “America in front 
of the parties” was one of his favourite slogans. For its part, the Republican Party 
has faced the presidential competition of 2016 with an attitude of almost resig-
nation and, above all, without convincing programmes or credible proposals 
from leaders to oppose Trump. The various Jeb Bush, last offspring of the fa-
mous presidential family, Ted Cruz, Texan ultraconservative senator, Marco 
Rubio, apart from the shadowy profile from the political point of view, were not 
able to be accredited with the Republican electorate as valid alternatives. All, 
however, will withdraw before the Cincinnati Convention, and all will have the 
opportunity to speak out against the first political initiatives of Trump, especially 
with regard to the so-called “Russia Connection” and the omissions on the case 
of the “Ku-Klux-Klan”, which touch on two essential points in American con-
servative culture: anti-communism and anti-fascism (although referred to far 
from the two cases mentioned). Moreover, none of the top one hundred Ameri-
can newspapers have expressed endorsement in favour of Trump, and even “At-
lantic” and “Usa Today”, traditional megaphones of the Republican Party, have 
even called for a vote for Clinton in order to leave no room for a “demagogue, 
sexist, xenophobic, ignorant and liar” character like Donald Trump. Not to 
mention the critical reservations expressed by other conservative newspapers 
such as the Dallas Morning News, the Arizona Republic, the San Diego Un-
ion-Tribune and the Cincinnati Expirer. 
On the other side of the ocean there are other events that confirm this trend. 
Meanwhile, at the same time as Trump’s victory in the USA, the referendum on 
Brexit - Britain’s exit from the European Union - was another significant episode 
in the estrangement of the electorate from the party system. Her Majesty’s sub-
jects, breaking the doubts and hesitations of the major parties, conservative and 
Labour, express themselves with more than half of the consensus in favour of a 
break with Europe, following, in fact, Nigel Farage’s Ukip approach, whose elec-
toral consent is directly (and positively) related to the European nature of the 
consultations (for example for the Parliament in Strasbourg and in 2016 for 
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Brexit), riding this formation the widespread feelings of scepticism if not open 
hostility in the majority of English towards European policies (especially eco-
nomic and immigration). 
After the announcement of the referendum results, Cameron stood down as 
Prime Minister. This was despite the fact that he’d won the general election just 
over a year before with an increased majority. He stood down as an MP two and 
a half months later. Cameron’s gambit paid off and in 2015 the Conservatives 
won an overall majority in parliament ensuring the referendum. At the time, 
The Independent’s Matthew Norman described the referendum as an act of “in-
describably selfish recklessness”. The Independent’s Matthew Norman described 
the referendum as an act of “indescribably selfish recklessness”. 
As prime minister, Cameron had his reservations about the influence of the 
European Union on Britain. Early in his political career he had opposed the in-
troduction of the euro into British currency and had, in fact, used his opposition 
to the euro as a key pledge in his very first electoral campaign, in opposition to 
some senior party officials. Despite his scepticism, Cameron campaigned exten-
sively with the pro-EU remain campaign, alongside politicians from both ends of 
the political spectrum. In brief: Cameron had serious qualms about Britain’s 
place within the EU and the overbearing legislation imposed on the country. 
However, ultimately, he believed the country was stronger as an EU member 
state than an independent country [MacShawe, 2015]. 
But the true miracle of leadership has been made by Nick Farange to head the 
Ukip, interpreting the widespread resentment of the British against the EU and 
mobilizing the voters in the referendum in a trans-party way to vote for the exit 
from Europ. 
But the real case from manual of democratic system to leader without party is 
in France with the election of Emmanuel Macron as President of the Republic in 
2017 and with the election of the National Assembly, whose absolute majority is 
delivered by the voters to En Marche, an almost phantasmagorical party with a 
subliminal reference - in the name - to the national anthem of Marseille, literally 
“invented” by Macron and his entourage. Organisatively destroyed - registering 
is simple, you give your name without paying, and without other formalities: if 
you like the idea, you are inside - and ideologically. But also sociologically, since 
we do not know how many and which sectors of the French electorate voted for 
it. 
In fact, it is a rather confused, “liquid” rassemblement [to use the words of 
Bauhamann], which explicitly declares, in the words of its leader, “neither right 
nor left”. From the point of view of political geometry, it would remain the cen-
tre. But this position, within the bipartisan structure of the French system, is not 
so much a political place as an electoral one, obviously inhabited by moderates 
who, with their movements, often determine the victory of the centre-right or 
centre-left coalitions. And in any case, in the case of the 2017 elections, the par-
ties traditionally placed in this area—the Gaullists and the Republicans of Fil-
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lon2—express themselves explicitly in favour of an endorsement in favor of Ma-
cron. In the same way, centre-left and centre-right parties compete, especially 
between the first and second rounds. In the PSF, the socialist party from which 
Macron himself originally came [with a resumé as a technocrat and banker, he 
was economic consultant and then Minister of Holland], defined him as ‘the 
man, the project of the moment’. The right wing is covered by Bayrou’sMoDem, 
heir of the “Unionists”3. The far left of Mélenchon4 and the far right of Marin Le 
Pen, who is the losing challenger to the presidential elections, remain outside the 
chorus of approva. 
4. Italy’s Version 
The model of democracy at leaders-without-party offers interesting feedback 
also in the recent Italian political history. The Italian case provides an important 
confirmation to the entire process of transformation of democracy we are talk-
ing about. 
The strengthening of executive power outside the traditional patterns of par-
liamentarianism, the crisis of de-legitimization of the party system, show the 
most evident outline of “chancellor democracy”. The accentuated personaliza-
tion of political leadership and the growth of populist sentiments in the civic 
culture and through all the social groups, as is clear after the 2018 elections, in-
tegrate the series of elements that mark the model of drift of representative de-
mocracy, as we have seen comparatively succeeding in many others countries of 
the Western World. 
In 1994 he began to play the role of Berlusconi that the party-Forza 
Italia-invented from scratch, like Macron, as an electoral committee. It was then 
Monti’s turn, after the experience of technocratic government at the end of the 
millennium, that constituted an electoral list, “SceltaCivica”, to guarantee him-
self and his few supporters a minimum of political survival. Therefore, we have 
the experience of the Renzi government, the most consistent with the logic of 
partylessleaderism. Indeed, the party is there and it is the PD. However, it can-
not be said to be united around his leader, who for his part prefers to lean on a 
small group of trusted friends (someone maliciously gives him the name of 
“Magic Lily”5 [Huffington Post, August 4, 2015] and on “variable geometry” 
majorities for legislative activity. So as not to leave out Grillo and his “five-star” 
movement, whose fortunes are linked to the failure of traditional politics, to the 
 
 
2He says: “We are not even centrist, we are central”. 
3In his recent book, Résolutionfrançaise, Francois Bayrou (2017) makes a speech that takes up that 
of his new ally: “Left and right are groups that are now empty, or at least largely exhausted”. 
4Which speaks of a “majority without legitimacy”, also referring to participation rates, actually not 
much below the average in France [Melenchon, 2017]. 
5“The technocrats say that there are rational solutions to political problems, whether the people like 
it or not. Populism, which rejects the primacy of the so-called experts, offers an equal and opposite 
alternative. Tecnocracy and populism have in common the rejection of mediation, and therefore of 
representative democracy. Just as democracy serves the people, populism serves the elite” [Muller, 
2001]. 
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crisis of representativeness of political parties, to the populist and/or techno-
cratic drift of the civic culture of the country, since populism and technocracy 
can be considered two sides of the same “qualunquista” (politically apathetic) 
medal that often favours and distinguishes the transition to democracy with 
leaders-without-party4. 
Indeed, in the case of the Five Star Movement and its leader Beppe Grillo, it 
would be more appropriate to speak of anti-leaders: like those who act through 
social mobilization, promoted digitally - but made in the streets and amplified 
by the media-like the “V-Days”6. But Renzi, the “scraper”, is also an anti-leader, 
who has built his own affirmation on the demolition and integral replacement of 
the traditional political class. And, coherently, it has conquered the leadership of 
the PD with the legitimization of the mass rite of the primaries. He did not cre-
ate a ‘personal party’. But it has over-customised the Democratic Party. He gave 
it his own image. On the contrary, it imposed and overlapped it. Because the PD, 
for history and organization, is not able to coagulate around “a” leader. The PD, 
thus, became the PDR. The Democratic Party of Renzi. That exploits and sums 
up the rooting of the PD and the personal attraction of the leader. This explains 
the unexpected success at the European elections. In the name of the removal of 
the old ruling class. Renzi, however, affirmed a hyper-personalized model of 
leadership (and democracy) [Diamanti, 2014]. 
It is not just a coincidence that, after Macron's victory, the race for eulogy and 
emulation began. Monti speaks of “a considerable convergence of views”; Renzi, 
with more emphasis twist: “now we march ahead too” and fairy tale of a NPC 
(party of the nation) neither left, nor right, adopting the slogan of En Marche. 
5. Hibrid, Dissociative or Personal Party Democracy 
A “hybrid democracy”, defines Diamanti as the regime recognizable in the Ital-
ian political system which, after the elections of 2013, assumed new forms of 
representation [Ibidem]. As is described in the idealistic models of comparative 
politics, it is a regime poised between liberal-democracy and authoritarianism 
[ibidem]. The new model, which came to the fore at the end of the 90’s, has as its 
next cause widespread abstention, in turn caused by the crisis of legitimacy of 
the institutions and of the party system. The citizens-electors from protagonists 
have become spectators, unlike the democracy of the parties of “first republic” 
and the democracy of the public of “second republic”.  
This situation of crisis has been also presented in the terms and substance of a 
“dissociative democracy”, in a sense literally opposed to Lijphart’s idea of a 
“consensual democracy” [Lijphart, 2001]. The dissociation that is highlighted 
here is that of a society (in Italy) in which the “fractures”, identified by Lijphart 
in the face of a political system that tends to counterbalance these conflicting 
 
 
6“V-day” stands for the day of “fuck you”, the vulgar insult turned against politicians, political par-
ties and estabilishment, the watchword with which the movement, until then only mediatic, materi-
alizes for the first time in tens of thousands of people mobilized in the streets of Bologna in the au-
tumn of 2007. 
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pressures with large and sometimes unthinkable coalitions of government, do 
not persist, but a society where lines are developed, even if weak, of solidarity 
against political elites and parties in perennial conflict, almost at war with each 
other for the conquest of power for power, having lost any reference to the social 
base of representation [De Mucci, 2013]. 
Both analyses converge, however, in defining what is looming, in the run-up 
to the 2013 elections, as an electoral democracy, personal, mediatized, which 
brings together different manifestations of pathology. Among the most con-
spicuous (and worrying), the transformation of the parties that have preferred 
television and media communication to active participation and organization on 
the territory, as well as the leadership and personalization of the management, 
using consultants and marketing professionals. Think of the birth of the 
“five-star movement”: born on the net, it immediately affirmed Grillo as a leader 
disguised as “anti-leader”, while populism has become a style of political lan-
guage and communication. 
Diamanti writes about it: 
“Media populism. This orientation is fuelled by the way in which media policy 
and government are dealt with. In programmes where priority is given to the 
themes of daily life, which listen to and make popular men, places and topics of 
politics. So the boundaries between entertainment and deepening almost disap-
pear. Everything mixes and hybrids... journalists, actors, soubrettes, cooks, ex-
perts of all kinds: together with politicians they participate in pop politics. 
Where to become and remain popular, political leaders must adopt a populist 
style and language. On the other hand, ideologies are no longer taken into ac-
count and are replaced by narratives. Storytelling” [Diamanti, 2014: p. 29-30]. 
Mauro Calise also believes that, with the advent of the digital network and 
cultures, public opinion is “put in a corner”. To leave room for who and what, it 
is, however, still difficult to say. For Calise, Italy remains, even today, an 
anomalous case in the Western panorama, since the absence of an “authoritative 
and consolidated monocratic institutional role to which to anchor the trend of 
personalization” has generated a full identification between person and 
party—the “personal party”—which does not seem at all destined to decline and, 
above all, to be supplanted by organizational forms capable of reactivating par-
ticipatory and democratic circuits [Calise, 2013]. 
“Modern leaders are not on course for democracy; on the contrary, in many 
ways, they embody its extreme development. They enjoy broad popular support, 
in increasingly plebiscite and sondocratic forms that cannot, however, be ac-
cused of violating the basic principle of democracy: the investiture by a majority 
of voters. Their strength lies precisely in being able to boast of having res-
tored—often through the instrument of direct election—the relationship be-
tween leaders and people that the old parties had worn out. Moreover, the con-
centration of command in a single man is taking place today, while state institu-
tions appear increasingly incapable of fulfilling their historical role as a con-
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tainer and reference for the associated life. The first body of the king regains the 
upper hand also because the second body appears in disintegration” [Calise, 
2016: p. 39]. 
The new leaders come to power with two key elements of post-modernity. 
First of all, the ability to reflect, and interpret, that centrality of the individual 
which is the emerging cultural trait at the turn of the century. Anticipated by the 
Thatcherian and Reaganian revolutions, declined in the obvious ideology of neo-
liberalism, the narcissistic explosion of the ego is the social platform that re-
launches personal power as a model of leadership. By joining and multiplying 
with the second factor that distorts the institutional building: the triumph of en-
tertainment politics, which turns its spotlight on large-and small-personalities. 
Contained at the beginning by the systems of self-protection and self-censorship 
of the old parties, the invasion of television overturns in a few years the formats 
of the national networks. From the incipitated and marshy television stands of 
the beginnings we pass to the stands of the people in direct and uncontrolled 
grip with their audience. Instead of politicians without a body, the exhibition of 
the media body of leaders, the new icon of mass communication, triumphs. 
Unlike Forza Italia, the PD of Renzi is definitely not a personal party [Calise, 
2010; McDonnell, 2013]. It is not a party-company, of a “proprietary” nature: a 
party that begins and ends with its leader, as it is inseparably linked to the finan-
cial and organizational (private) resources of the founder. On the contrary, it is a 
party that “pre-exists” the leader. And (probably) he will survive the leader. A 
party with a solid organization, an articulated territorial structure, and “rules” 
that govern internal life. They shall limit the room for manoeuvre of the Secre-
tary in terms of his or her prerogatives and term of office. It is, however, a highly 
personalised party. At least in the process of rapid customization, due to the ef-
fect of the change impressed by the new leader [Bordignon, 2014: p. 439]. 
6. Conclusion—Another Kind of Leadership: At the  
Thresholds of Populism?  
There is no doubt that in recent years there has been a growing personalisation 
which is profoundly transforming, as well as the structures of parliamentary 
democracy, the very model of liberal democracy based on the principle of repre-
sentation. In truth, nothing is new in the history of Western political systems. In 
some ways one could speak of a progressive realization of what Max Weber had 
foreseen—but above all hoped for—in the last century at the dawn of the Wei-
mar Republic. But the crucial role that the media—and in particular televi-
sion—have assumed in this process in modernity seems, however, to call into 
question two essential aspects of his hypotheses. The first concerns the 
risks—seen by the German sociologist—that even through the media, deterio-
rating forms of personalization linked to the mobilization of the “emotional 
elements” of the masses can now find more space; a danger increased by the 
weakening of the organized parties that—contrary to what is often thought con-
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sidering above all the aforementioned papers—Weber did not see with favour. 
For him, effective personalisation should not have been a mere opposition to 
parties. The second aspect, always linked to the media, concerns the growing 
possibilities that these instruments offer of autonomy from the parties, but at the 
same time of greater dependence on particular interests mobilized by the leading 
candidates to finance the increasingly costly electoral campaigns [Weber, 1982: 
p. 178]. 
The combination of these two trends puts at risk an adequate selection of po-
litical figures with high moral qualities, competence and dedication to the cause 
of general interests. The essential precondition on which Weber based the inno-
vation expectations of political leaders in support of the general interests of the 
nation-state thus becomes more fragile [Weber, 1971: p. 99]. But Weber’s strong 
link between personalization and the consequences of political action is also 
questioned from the point of view of the expected benefits of greater deci-
sion-making capacity and speed. We have seen how customisation is more pre-
sent in majority democracies than in consensual ones, but it does not go hand in 
hand with clearly distinctive results in terms of better socio-economic perform-
ance in majority contexts. Rather, as we have seen, if we were to interpret the 
benefits of the leadership that Weber wanted as the ability to support market 
capitalism with strong cohesion and social integration that would strengthen the 
nation-state, it is consensual democracies, especially those of continental 
Europe, that are the closest to this goal. However, the reasons why personalisa-
tion is more widespread in majority contexts but does not bring the benefits in 
terms of public action that are often attributed to it still need to be examined in 
depth from a theoretical point of view. It is not possible to address the problem 
here, but we can, in conclusion, put forward a number of hypotheses. First of all, 
in a context characterised by majority electoral rules and competition between 
two parties—in which “winners take everything”—we need greater cultural co-
hesion, a more homogenous political culture that mitigates the risks of change 
for those who are defeated, hence the narrowest ideological and programmatic 
differences between the parties. But from here also the more favourable condi-
tions for the personalization of leadership are: the less the programmatic differ-
ences are, the more space it is necessary to give to the personal characters of the 
candidates to distinguish themselves and seek more consensus. In addition to 
this factor, one can also consider that in a situation where only two parties are 
protagonists, the drive to win an electorate that is placed at the center of the po-
litical spectrum, and is decisive for the electoral victory, requires the combina-
tion of different interests and not easily reconcilable. 
The personalization of the leadership, shifting the focus on the candidate’s 
characters—his competence, his reliability, his image—allows to maintain a 
more uncertain and ambiguous programmatic offer without penalizing the party 
in the competition. It also gives the leader more power than the leadership and 
the members of his party and allows him to make difficult choices [Colin, 2007]. 
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For example, in the case of a centre-left party, to make choices that guarantee the 
consent of the moderate electorate even at the expense of its own base of refer-
ence in the less privileged groups. As a consequence, however, it is likely that ab-
stention or populism will increase among these very groups [Iversen & Soskice, 
2006; Hay 2007]. This leads us to the problem of the consequences. Personal 
leadership of the moderate electorate, on whose consent electoral victory de-
pends, will be less inclined to engage in effective redistributive or regulatory ac-
tion that penalises the middle electorate in terms of taxation or other con-
straints. This trend is combined with a generally more liberal political culture, in 
favour of de-regulation and a more limited welfare. Industrial relations and the 
role of trade unions are not encouraged, and representation of interests remains 
pluralist. On the other hand, the greater instability of the personal leadership di-
rects the political action in the shorter term, in search of immediate consensus, 
and this does not favour more complex interventions but of greater strategic 
impact, which have a longer yield and require the consultation with the repre-
sentative organizations of interest. Hence the outcome in terms of a more liberal 
capitalism with strong and growing social inequalities. In short, on the one hand 
Weber’s expectations of a growth in personalization seem to be confirmed, but 
on the other hand the effects in terms of economic and social performance that 
the German sociologist associated with consensus based on the personal quali-
ties of leaders and the greater concentration of power in their hands are not 
clearly distinguishable. Rather, one can see signs of a growing consumption of 
personal leadership, which is spreading, is increasingly sought after as a miracle 
drug but at the same time becomes lower quality, more unstable, and limited in 
its possibilities of action in favour of a market economy that is also socially co-
hesive. Can we then speak of a personalisation of leadership that increases speed 
and capacity for choice, but with greater difficulty in effectively combining 
growth and social cohesion? I believe that this question is legitimate and that it 
should be placed at the centre of the agenda today, not least through greater in-
tegration between sociology, political science and the political economy. 
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